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Despite the growing body of federal criminal law, our states remain
the primary units for crime control. Their legislatures enact the over-
whelming bulk of the penal codes. They maintain the police forces, in
some areas alone and in others in conjunction with their political sub-
divisions; they maintain judicial machinery for the trial of accused
persons, and operate the correctional institutions in which most convicted
offenders are punished or rehabilitated. Under these circumstances, it
is only' natural that the states should encounter virtually every problem
known to the usual administration of criminal justice. There is, how-
ever, an additional set of problems peculiar to a federal system like our
own. These challenges to the smooth operation of crime control pro-
grams arise principally from the division of jurisdiction among the
several states and between state and national governments. It is with
these special problems that we shall concern ourselves in this article.
Instances of intergovernmental cooperation in crime control are be-
coming numerous and varied but virtually all of them may be placed
within one of several overlapping but distinguishable categories:
1. Cooperation made necessary or advisable because the physical
jurisdiction of each state is limited by its territorial boundaries.
2. Cooperation looking toward the uniformity of substantive state
law.
3. Cooperation in gathering of information or in the establish-
ment and operation of common or joint services and facilities.
In addition to these problems, whose incidence is primarily interstate,
there are a number of federal-state relationships which are also im-
portant in crime control, and which will be reviewed in this article.
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PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION
A man may have committed murder in the State of Indiana but even
if this is well known, he may not be prosecuted for the crime by Illinois.
The reason is so well settled that we seldom stop to recite it. Reduced
to its simplest terms, the governing proposition is that a state may
punish only offenses against its own laws1 and those laws have no force
beyond the territorial limits of the state.2 Criminals have always sought
to benefit from this feature of our federal system by seeking safety
across jurisdictional lines. Such conduct has in turn forced law enforce-
ment authorities to devise means for minimizing the effect of political
boundaries on crime control.
The jurisdictional loopholes in our law-enforcement structure were
emphasized at the Attorney General's Conference on Crime held in
Washington during the month of December, 1934. An immediate surge
of interest in the problem was evinced by state officials throughout the
country, and effective action was taken through the means of the Inter-
state Commission on Crime which was brought into being in Trenton,
New Jersey, on October 12, 1935. 3 Composed of state Attorneys
General, legislators and law enforcement officials, and under the leader-
ship of Judge Richard Hartshorne of Essex County, New Jereey, the
Commission spearheaded a program of uniform crime control legisla-
tion that had far-reaching effects. Many of the proposals were revisions
of uniform acts originally promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but which had not theretofore
been widely enacted among the states. Others were entirely new acts
conceived by the Interstate Commission on Crime. Among the subjects
covered by the Commission's legislative proposals were uniform acts
on fresh pursuit, extradition, interstate rendition of witnesses, interstate
supervision of parolees and probationers, arrest, firearms, and narcotic
drugs. In addition, attention was given to the extension of federal
criminal law, the development of criminal statistics, and the establish-
ment of state and local crime commissions.
Since 1942, the activities of the Interstate Commission on Crime have
been integrated with those of the Council of State Governments, the
general service agency of all the states.' In addition, the Council also
1. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
2. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932).
3. INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CRIME, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL
(Fourth Printing, November 1, 1942), pp. 7-13.
4. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL
(Revised Edition, September, 1949), p. V.
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serves as the secretariat of the administrators' association which imple-
ments the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and
Probationers.
Generally speaking, a state may exercise criminal jurisdiction only
within its own territory. Consequently, it is necessary that suspects be
found and prosecuted within the state whose penal code has been vio-
lated. When persons seek to avoid enforcement efforts, the problem
becomes one of securing their physical presence. The two most familiar
methods for achieving this objective are fresh pursuit and extradition.
FRESH PURSUIT
Fresh pursuit is obviously the most expeditious manner of securing the
physical presence of a suspected criminal, especially where he is literally
"caught in the act." However, at one time the most desperate and
cunning criminals headed straight across the state line after the com-
mission of a crime, knowing full well that comparative safety lay just
across the boundary. For, in general, the pursuing officer from the state
in which the offense occurred was no longer an officer in the foreign
state. The Interstate Commission on Crime sought to remedy this
situation by its uniform act on the fresh pursuit of criminals across state
lines.5 Now enacted by over three-fourths of the states,6 this legislation
contains the following basic provisions:
1. Gives authority to peace officers from another state to enter the enacting
state in fresh pursuit of a person "in order to arrest him on the ground that he is
believed to have committed a felony in such other state" and to hold him in custody.
2. Provides that such peace officers shall, without unnecessary delay, take the
person before a magistrate of the county in which the arrest was made. The magis-
trate may commit the person so arrested to await extradition, or may admit him to
bail. If the magistrate "determines that the arrest was unlawful," he is required to
discharge the person arrested.
3. Defines fresh pursuit to include its common law meaning as well as the
pursuit of felons or suspected felons, and also to include pursuit where no felony
has actually been committed if there is reasonable ground for believing that a
felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit, as used in the uniform act, "shall not
necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without- unreasonable delay."
The practical operation of this brief but effective act has shown on
numerous occasions that state boundaries need not in themselves pro-
vide a loophole through which criminals may extricate themselves from
justice.
5. For text see ibid, p. 2.
6. In addition, the uniform fresh pursuit act has been enacted in the District of
Columbia. The following states have not yet enacted the uniform act: Alabama, Georgia,





Even though a considerable number of persons are apprehended im-
mediately after the commission of crime, it is inevitable that the identity
of most suspects should become ,known only after some period of time
has elapsed. This means that fresh pursuit, although useful, is ad-
dressed to but a portion of the interstate crime control problem. In
order to secure the return of persons already ensconced across a bound-
ary, it is usually necessary to resort to extradition proceedings.
The Constitution provides for the return of fugitives from justice by
one state to sister states7 and in the overwhelming number of cases,
there is cooperation in effecting such return." However, a proper regard
for individual liberty has hedged extradition with a number of restric-
tions. If a proceeding is to succeed, a demanding state has traditionally
been required to establish four propositions :o
1. That the person sought has been duly charged with substantial crime against
the laws of the demanding state.
2. That such person was physically present within the demanding state when
the alleged crime was committed.
3. That such person is a fugitive from justice.
4. That the person demanded is actually the person charged with the commis-
sion of the crime.
In particular circumstances, the proof of any one of these propositions
may be difficult. But those which have raised special problems for inter-
state law enforcement have been numbers two and three.
At first glance, it would ordinarily be assumed that a man must be
in a state in order to commit a crime there. There are, however, a
number of situations wherein this supposition may be incorrect. Take
first the somewhat bizarre events presented in State v. Hall.10 In that
case, a man standing in North Carolina shot and killed a man standing
in Tennessee. Attempted extradiction to Tennessee failed because the
offender was not present within that state when the crime was committed.
Its striking set of facts has made the Hall Case famous but if the
only difficulties were occasioned by such instances, there would be com-
paratively little cause for concern. More numerous are those crimes
which can be committed without physical presence. Provisions of penal
codes are voluminous and any attempt to canvass crimes of this type
7. U.S. Constit., Art. IV, sec. 2.
8. Despite the seemingly mandatory language of the Extradition Clause, the leading
case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861) holds that there is only a moral duty
placed upon a state to afford extradition. Consequently the return of fugitives is some-
times considered to be an exercise of comity.
9. DE GRTrFFaNIED, The Law of Extradition, 2 ALA. L. REv. 207, 216 (1950); for a
collection of the leading authorities see Note, Criminal Law, 31 MINN. L. REv. 699 (1947).
10. 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).
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would be far beyond the scope of the present article. However, two
illustrations may serve to indicate the possibilities. State laws quite
commonly make conspiracy to engage in various types of illegal conduct
crime in itself. Since the conspiracy may consist in the planning or
preparation of a crime, it may be done anywhere. So, as in a recent case,
persons in Los Angeles may conspire to commit robbery in Denver."'
The conspiracy constituted a crime against the laws of Colorado but the
suspects were not in Colorado.
Another kind of crime that can be committed while outside the juris-
diction of a state is that of non support. State laws often make it a
crime for husbands to refuse support to their families.' 2 Such a neglect
of family obligations may well commence when a man is absent from
home and in another state.
Indeed, cases such as the one just presented also illustrate difficul-
ties which may arise when a state attempts to establish the third prop-
osition required for successful extradition-namely, that the person
sought is a fugitive from justice. In order to be a fugitive, it is necessary
that the individual have fled the jurisdiction after committing a crime
there.' 8 But where a man refuses support after he is already in another
state, he cannot technically be a fugitive even though he has committed
an offense and is being sought for prosecution.
14
Many of the problems of extradition have been. solved by the wide-
spread enactment of the uniform extradition act, originally proposed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1926 and extensively revised by the Interstate Commission on Crime
11. Ex Parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Cal. 1948). Commented on in 22 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 60 (1948).
12. ZUCKERMAN, Some Legal Aspects of Matrimonial Discord, p. 2 (paper presented
before the National Conference of Jewish Social Welfare, Cleveland, Ohio, June 9, 1949).
13. See note 10, supra.
14. It should be noted in passing that criminal extradition is not a very satisfactory
method of enforcing the support of dependents. It has been found that the criminal process
is usually impractical because of expensive extradition costs, the limited nature of criminal
statutes in this field, and the fact that arrest and rendition destroy the very earning power
that can provide support. For this reason, the past two years have seen an immense
amount of activity in the field of reciprocal state legislation to provide an effective
civil remedy to enforce support of abandoned wives or children where a father absconds
to another state. Legislation of this nature was first enacted by the State of New York
(Laws of 1949 c. 807), and during the 1949-50 legislative sessions there were thirteen
states, plus Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which enacted bills patterned after New
York's pioneering measure. In the meantime the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws had the problem under analysis, and in the latter part of 1950
that body promulgated its "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act" (for text
of uniform act and descriptive material see COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATION-PROGPAM FOR 1951 (November, 1950), pp. 58-64. As this article is
being written, forty-one jurisdictions report having enacted substantially similar reciprocal
legislation to enforce by civil process the support of dependents. A manual of procedure




during the mid-thirties.' 5 The extradition act brings uniformity in a
great many procedural aspects of the law, such as the form of requisition
and the documents to accompany it; the arrest pending requisition as
well as after requisition; habeas corpus proceedings; and confinement in
transit. The act preserves the right to withhold extradition while a
criminal prosecution is pending in the asylum state or while the person
sought is serving a sentence there. It empowers the governor to extra-
dite a person who has entered the state involuntarily. In addition, the
uniform extradition act permits use of a waiver of extradition through
which the assent of the person sought makes formal procedures un-
necessary. In actual practice, extradition is very frequently waived with
a consequent saving in time, money and effort.
Most important from the point of view of the present analysis, the
uniform extradition act goes to the heart of the problems raised under
the propositions that a person sought by extradition must have been
within the demanding state when the alleged crime was committed and
must be a fugitive from justice. Section 6 of the uniform act permits
an accused person to be delivered to a demanding state even though
he is not a "fugitive from justice"; i.e., where the accused has com-
mitted an act in one state which constitutes a crime in another state-
even though he never physically enters the demanding state and con-
sequently cannot flee therefrom. 16 When the present-day ramifications
of organized crime are contemplated, the importance of this provision
becomes apparent. For unless the demanding state-the state such as
Colorado, to use our previous example-can have the cooperation of
other states in securing the accused person for trial, that person (or
criminal syndicate) is largely immune from successful prosecution.
RENDITION OF WITNESSES
Assuming that a criminal has been tracked down, arrested, and
brought to trial in a given state-with or without the help of the
upiform fresh pursuit act and the uniform extradition act-it may still
be necessary to enlist interstate cooperation to surmount the problems
of territorial jurisdiction. This is the case when an important witness
15. For text see THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, supra note 4, pp. 10-15.
The following states have not enacted uniform extradition legislation: Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Washington.
16. Care must be used in pleading under Section 6. Because extradition proceedings
have generally required a showing that a person is a "fugitive from justice," warrants
sometimes inadvertently make this allegation even where the uniform act is being used.
If made, the allegation must be proved even though such proof would otherwise be
unnecessary due to the language of Section 6. Ex Parte King, 139 Me. 203, 28 A.2d 562
(1942); Buck v. Britt, 187 Misc. 217, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 479 (1946). For discussion see Note,
Habeas Corpus-Extradition Cases, 10 0. St. L. J. 362, 364 (1949).
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is located in another state either because he resides there or because
he has fled there. Virtually all of the states have cooperated in this
regard by enacting the uniform act "to secure the attendance of wit-
nesses from, within or without a state in criminal proceedings." 17 This
measure, as sponsored by the Interstate Commission on Crime in 1936,
contains the following provisions:
1. The judge of a court of record in the enacting state is authorized to order
that a material witness be taken into custody, if necessary, and delivered to an
officer of the requesting state to be transported to that state to attend and testify
in a criminal prosecution pending in that state.
2. The judge of a court of record in the enacting state is also authorized to
issue a certificate to a court in another state enacting a similar law requesting the
presence of the desired witness.
3. A witness entering the state under the act shall not "be subject to arrest or
the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose
before his entrance into this state under the summons." The same holds true if the
witness is passing through the enacting state en route to a third state to testify.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The three uniform acts just discussed present problems of constitu-
tionality in varying degree. The fresh pursuit statute occasions vir-
tually no difficulty. Of courses, it is true that no state may confer powers
on officers acting beyond fier territorial limits but this is not the effect
of the legislation. When in a foreign state, a peace officer operates
under the authority conferred by the statute of the jurisdiction in which
he finds himself. Accordingly, there is no attempt to give a state statute
extraterritorial application.
The uniform extradition act did raise a point of some substance,
particularly in regard to Section 6. That part of the statute makes
it unnecessary for a person to be a "fugitive from justice" in order to be
a subject of extradition. Since the federal extradition statute does
require that a person be a "fugitive from justice,"18 it was argued that
the uniform act conflicted with a statute of Congress and with the under-
lying provision of the Constitution. 19 However, it has been held that
neither the Constitution nor the federal legislation occupies the entire
field and that states may provide supplementary procedures which
broaden the extent of permissible extradition. Specifically, Section 6 of
the Uniform Act has been held constitutional.
20
17. For text see THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, supra note 4, pp.
31-33. The following states have not enacted uniform legislation in this field: Alabama,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. see. 662.
19. See Note, 5 FoRDiAM L. REv. 489 (November, 1936).
20. Ex Parte Morgan, supra note 11. See also Note,, 35 VA. L. REV. 116 (1949).
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The uniform rendition of witnesses Act raises the most difficult
question. The persons whom it seeks to reach are not charged with
any offense. Their forcible removal to another jurisdiction is to meet
no claim which the requesting state can legally enforce upon them par-
ticularly if the prospective witness is not a citizen of the state wherein
testimony is desired. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the statute
must depend on the power of a state to compel persons located within
its borders to aid the judicial processes of another jurisdiction. Litiga-
tion under the uniform rendition of witnesses Act is not extensive.
However, one court has held that a state may require persons to give
testimony in another jurisdiction as a matter of its own public policy.
21
No doubt the element of reciprocity is vital here because it permits
a state to expect like assistance from other jurisdictions in return,
thereby indirectly but substantially promoting the domestic adminis-
tration of justice.
Thus it may be seen that the states have taken long steps to provide,
by means of interstate cooperation and through uniform legislation,
that physical jurisdiction as limited by territorial boundaries shall not
be a major loophole for the benefit of the criminal element. Some few
states, it is true, have not as yet joined in the movement toward uni-
formity in this regard, but their number is gradually diminishing to zero.
VALUES OF UNIFORMITY
In one way or another, most approaches to the problems of inter-
state crime control are related to uniformity of laws. Efficient extra-
dition, fresh pursuit, and rendition of witnesses require uniformity be-
cause no state is likely to offer maximum cooperation unless arrange-
ments are reciprocal and because the interstate contacts involved are in-
creasingly more difficult to maintain if a multiplicity of unfamiliar
procedures must be followed. Indeed where a common pattern of ad-
ministrative behavior is necessary, as with the interstate supervision of
parolees and probationers, operations would be virtually impossible
without the adherence of states to a single basic compact.
22
In some other fields of criminal law, there are different reasons for
promoting uniformity of state laws. For example, it is inevitable that
events in sister jurisdictions should have an effect upon the incidence
of particular types of crime in a particular state. This is especially
21. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N.Y.S. 713
(1911) [construing an early rendition of witnesses statute].




true where equipment or supplies of some sort are useful in the doing
of an antisocial act. Narcotics may play a part in crime no matter
where they are secured. Accordingly, the states have attempted to con-
trol the acquisition, sale and possession of narcotics for many, years.
But where there are wide differences in regulatory legislation, some
jurisdictions are likely to be less effective than others in keeping drugs
away from prospective dope peddlers and addicts. As a result, criminals
will secure narcotics in one state for use in another. In order to prevent
this shopping for the instruments of crime and to provide an effective
system of regulation, the uniform narcotic drug act came into being
and has received wide adoption. 23 The heart of the act is to be found in
its system of licensing of buyers, sellers, and users of those narcotic
drugs most suited to criminal activity. 24 A similar problem exists in the
small arms field and is dealt with by the uniform pistol act whose key
provisions also call for licensing.25 Unfortunately, almost none of the
states have seen fit to enact this uniform legislation.26
However, it should not be assumed that it is either necessary or
desirable to bring uniformity into all areas of the criminal law. One
of the virtues of our federal system is that it permits wide latitude for
the expression of divergent local policies. The states need restrain
their individuality only where insistence upon it is likely to have unfor-
tunate consequences in their own or sister jurisdjctions. In the com-
mercial field, uniformity in almost all phases of the law is a desirable
goal because of the convenience to persons engaged in interstate transac-
tions. But there is no corresponding advantage to be gained from
promoting the convenience of law breakers. Of course, all persons
should have reasonable notice of the law. But this presents little diffi-
culty because the outlines of antisocial conduct are well known. What
varies most is the definition of particular crimes. Whether something
is petit larceny in one state and grand larceny in another, or arson in
the first degree in one jurisdiction and arson in the second degree
in another is of little significance to the enforcement officials because
they administer only the laws of their own jurisdiction. Nor is it of
23. 'All states have enacted uniform legislation in this field except California, Kansas,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington. National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, HANDBOOK (1950), p. 284.
24. For text see UNIFORM NARconc DRUG AcT As AMENDED, promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on August 27, 1942..
25. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see WARNER, The Uniform Pistol Act,
29 JoUR. CRim. LAW AND CRLMINOL. 529 (1938).
26. For text see HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, supra note 3, pp. 111-114.
Only New Hampshire and North Dakota enacted the uniform pistol act. The earlier
uniform firearms act had been enacted by four states, and with modifications by six addi-
tional jurisdictions. Neither of these acts is now being carried in the program of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
1952]
CRIHFIELD AND WENDELL
substantial importance to the public at large because no state sets
as its objective the encouragement of petit larceny as opposed to its
bigger brother. The objective is to prevent them both.
Of course, this is not to say that uniformity is to be discouraged in
any phase of the law where the states themselves want it. It may be
that a particular approach to some problem commends itself as better
than any of the available alternatives. This may be the case with regard
to the law of arrest. Some years ago, it was generally observable that
the law in this field was archaic in most states.2 7 Accordingly, the In-
terstate Commission on Crime prepared a uniform arrest act, the
provisions of which were deemed to be especially desirable. However,
it has so far received only limited acceptance among state legislatures .
2
It seems possible that the future will bring other instances wherein
the need for common adherence to a cooperative plan of action or wide
acceptance of a single legislative solution to a given problem will lead
to the increase of uniformity in the criminal law.
AN EXAMPLE OF COOPERATIVE INTERSTATE ADMINISTRATION
An excellent example of interstate cooperation in crime control is
to be found in the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees
and Probationers.2 ' This cooperative vehicle does not, however, lend
itself to discussion under any single one of the categories set forth
at the beginning of this article. Indeed, it cuts clear across all three of
them. An analysis of, the compact may logically be set forth at this
point, since probation or parole are the rehabilitative aspects of a
sequence which includes apprehension, extradition, and trial.
Rehabilitation of those convicted of crime is essential to community
wellbeing. State parole and probation officials long have recognized
that such rehabilitation can be furthered by transfer of a parolee or pro-
bationer to another jurisdiction, because of family ties in another state
or because of better employment opportunities there. The problem
formerly lay in the fact that, without a binding interstate agreement,
literally thousands of such persons lived outside of the state of their
offense, free from the slightest enforceable control or supervision. This
was the jurisdictional problem requiring interstate cooperation.
To answer this need, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision
of Parolees and Probationers was drafted and signed by the first
27. WARNER, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315 (1942).
28. N. H. Laws of 1941 c. 982; R.I.P.L. of 1941 c. 163; Del. Laws of 1951 c. 304.
29. 48 Stat. 909 (1934). For text see THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL,
supra note 4, pp. 46-48.
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group of states in 1937. Gradually the number of states signatory to
the compact has increased, and by virtue of the action taken by Georgia,
North Carolina and Texas during 1950 and 1951, every state is now a
full, legal member of this interstate agreement.80 Because of the con-
tractual nature of the agreement, it was vital that there be absolute uni-
formity of the language ratified by each of the states.
The compact is not a self executing instrument. It contemplates an
administrative arrangement which must be carried into effect by the
cooperative efforts of all the states. That it has worked well is evidenced
by the fact that some ten thousand cases are being handled under the
aegis of the compact at all times. To further the smooth operation
of the compact, the official compact administrators who have been named
by their governors have banded together into the Compact Adminis-
trators' Association for the interchange of information and the estab-
lishment of joint services and facilities. This is the third category of
interstate cooperation in crime control that was mentioned at the out-
set of this article. As an administrative arrangement between and among
the states, the compact serves many practical purposes. Broadly and
briefly stated, it renders the negative function of capturing criminals
who have violated the terms of their conditional freedom; on the other
hand, it performs the positive function of encouraging rehabilitation
by permitting transfer to a receptive environment where the chance for
success is greatest.
How THE COMPACT WORKS
This agreement among the states involves the following steps:
1. Any state will permit a parolee or probationer from another com-
pacting state to return on parole or probation if he is a resident
(defined as an inhabitant for more than a year and not absent for
more than six continuous months immediately preceding the com-
mission of his offense), if his family resides in the state, and if he can
secure employment. If residence can not be shown, transfer of super-
vision from state to state may be obtained through mutual consent of
the compacting states.
2. The state consenting to a transfer of an out-of-state parolee
or probationer to its supervisory charge agrees to exercise the same
care and treatment as its state standards permit for supervising its own.
probationers or parolees.
30. N. C. Laws of 1951 c. 1137; Texas Laws of 1951, H.B. 658; Ga. Act 796 (1950).
For citations to the other state ratifications see THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME:
CONTROL, supra note 4, p. 49..
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3. If a state desires to retake a probationer or parolee who has
left its immediate jurisdiction under provisions of the compact, an
accredited officer of the state may apprehend and retake the person
in another compacting state without formalities other than establishing
his authority and proving the identity of the person to be retaken.
All legal requirements to obtain extradition of fugitives from justice
are expressly waived by the states under the compact, and by the
individual parolee or probationer whose grant of liberty is made condi-
tional upon his signing a waiver of extradition.
Rules, regulations, and forms designed to standardize operations and
to facilitate smooth administration have been agreed upon and are in
daily use by the compacting states. From time to time, new or amended
forms and regulations are developed by the administrators.
COURT DECISIONS
The compact has on a number of occasions been subjected to attack
on constitutional grounds, but it has always withstood the scrutiny of
the courts.3 ' It is perhaps unfortunate that no definitive ruling has ever
been laid down by the United States Supreme Court, but this is only
because no person who contested the compact unsuccessfully in any
state court has ever seen fit to carry the case further. This means, of
course, that there may be sporadic state-by-state testing of the com-
pact where no state supreme court has yet handed down a decision.
The leading case on the constitutionality of the compact is generally
considered to be Ex Parte Joseph Tenner.32 In that case the petitioner
contended that the compact was repugnant to the Extradition, Compact,
and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution and also to federal extra-
dition statutes. The California court declared that the only serious
question presented by the petitioner was the one dealing with extra-
dition under the United States Constitution and federal acts, and this
contention was answered by the court in the following language:
The existence of an independent method of securing the return of out-of-state
parolees does not conflict with nor render ineffectual the federal laws with relation
to extradition. The federal method of extradition is always present and may be
invoked when necessary to secure the right to return of the fugitive to the demanding
state. Also states not party to the interstate compact are free to invoke that pro-
cedure to secure the return of fugitive parolees. And if a state has elected to follow
the federal procedure and claim the constitutional guarantee, the fugitive of course
has the right to insist, on habeas corpus, that the procedure conform to the federal
law. Similarly the parolee detained under the interstate compact has the right to
31. Gulley v. Apple, 213 Ark. 350, 210 S.W. 2d 514 (1948) ; Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash.
:2d 52, 195 P2d 112; Rankin v. Ruthazer, 98 N.Y.S.,2d 104 (1950).
32. 20 Ca 2d 670, 128 P2d 338 (1942).
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complain, by means of habeas corpus, if that law is not complied with by the au-
thorities. But no right exists on the part of the parolee, whose parole has been
revoked, to claim that he may only be removed by the method of his choosing. And
since the statute applies uniformly to all parolees from states party to the compact,
the petitioner may not complain that the statute deprives him of the equal protection
of the laws.3 s
A COMPACT AMENDMENT
What to do with parole and probation violators has been a problem
of some seriousness. When other measures fail, the final recourse is to
incarcerate the violator for the balance of his sentence or for what-
ever other period is determined upon pursuant to law. But persons
being supervised under the compact are in states other than the send-
ing state. Accordingly, there have been only two alternatives available.
Either the violator could be left free of effective control or he could
be brought back to the sending state. The former course is obviously
unsatisfactory while, the latter can be both inconvenient and expensive,
especially where the distance between sending and receiving states is
great.
In order to meet this problem, an amendment to the compact was
prepared and suggested to the state legislatures. At the 1951 sessions
(the first opportunity for state action) the amendment was adopted by
Idaho, Utah, and Connecticut.3 4 It provides for incarceration in the
receiving state at the option of the sending state. Since states do not
enforce the penal laws of other jurisdictions, 35 the amendment makes.
the receiving state the agent of the sending state for purposes of such
incarceration and provides for the retention of jurisdiction over the:
prisoner by the sending state.
Since there has not yet been time for many states to adopt the amend-
ment or for those states which have adopted it to commence operations
under its provisions, there is no record of experience to report at this.
time. In addition, it should be pointed out that states which do 'not,
adopt the amendment will continue to operate under the basic compact..
The amendment provides an additional instrument for the effective-
supervision of parolees and probationers in states adopting it and:
does not supersede the original compact.
FEDERAL-STATE ASPECTS OF CRIME CONTROL
Although the primary purpose of this article has been to survey-
33. Ibid.
34-. Conn. Laws of 1951, H.B. 259; Id. Laws of 1951 c. 101; Ut. Laws of 1951, S.B. 210.




developments in the field of interstate crime control, there are certain
national-state relationships that require notice because they more or
less directly affect the success of interstate action. It is important to
remember that the national government, unlike any of the states, asserts
its jurisdiction throughout the country. It is thereby enabled to render
substantial assistance in dealing with interstate crime problems. Also,
the United States Constitution as interpreted by the courts has placed
some restrictions on intergovernmental cooperation in the interest of
individual liberty.
We have already seen that the states' limited territorial jurisdiction
has led to a movement for certain types of uniform legislation. But
even before the states themselves became active in the promotion of
cooperative crime control activity, the national government had under-
taken to aid state law enforcement. A principal difficulty, however, was
that the power to protect health, safety, morals, and general welfare
(usually referred to as the police power) is reserved to the states. 36 It
was therefore necessary for Congress to adapt other powers to the
desired purpose, particularly the commerce power.
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION
Starting at about the turn of the century, Congress began to prohibit
the interstate movement of persons and commodities in limited situa-
tions related to crime. One statute first enacted at that time forbids the
interstate transportation of game killed in violation of state law,37 a
later law forbids the interstate transportation of kidnapped persons;",
and still another prohibits the transportation of stolen motor vehicles
across state lines. 39 These and similar statutes make such transporta-
tion criminal under federal law. The proscribed conduct is prosecuted as
a federal offense even though transportation is only incidental to the
real evil whose control is sought. Practically speaking, the goal is to
prevent or to punish acts like kidnapping and larceny-crimes cognizable
in the state courts-whenever jurisdictional difficulties make it impos-
sible for local authorities to reach the criminal.
A recent statute of the type just discussed makes it a crime knowingly
to ship or transport gambling devices in interstate commerce.40 In most
respects this law is not unusual except in so far as recent awareness of
interstate gambling problems may make it very timely. However, one
36. U. S. Constit., Amendment X.
37. 31 Stat. 188 (1900).
38. 47 Stat. 326 (1932).
39. 41 Stat. 324 (1919).
40. P.L. 906, 81st Congress, 2d Session; Approved january 2, 1951.
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provision of the act is notable. It is to the effect that the prohibitions
contained in the law shall not apply to a state which has legislated to
exempt itself from its application. Nor shall the law apply to a political
subdivision where the state in which it is located has legislated to provide
for the exemption of that subdivision. In other words, the extent to
which this federal law will be operative depends on the crime control
policy of individual states. "Local option" arrangements are not en-
tirely new,41 but this statute marks their first application to the crime
control field.
A statute that also employs the national commerce power but is unique
in its closeness of contemplated cooperation with the states is the Fugi-
tive Felon Act,42 originally passed by Congress in 1934. In its early
form, this law provided that it should be a crirhe against the United
States for any person to use the channels of interstate commerce to avoid
prosecution for a crime or to avoid testifying in a criminal case. It was
further provided that prosecution of this federal crime could be had
only in the judicial district where the prosecution for the original offense
would be had. It was clear that this law was intended to serve much
the same purpose as the uniform, extradition and uniform witnesses acts
but as these statutes had not yet become significant instruments of law
enforcement, the legislation was doubly useful. However, it was limited
in scbpe. The only legal proceedings to which it applied were those for
murder, kidnapping, burglary, robbery, mayhem, rape, assault with a
dangerous weapon, and extortion accompanied by threats of violence,
or attempts to commit any of the foregoing crimes. But even more
limiting was the decision in United States v. Brandenburg4 where the
act was held applicable only to these crimes as defined at common law.
Since the criminal law of all the states is codified and since the penal
codes quite commonly define even the enumerated crimes differently
than they were defined at common law, the usefulness of the law was
substantially impaired.
In order to meet the Brandenburg Decision and so that the general
effectiveness of the act might be increased, it was extensively amended
in 1946.4 As the law now stands, it applies to the named crimes as
defined either at common law or by statute. In addition, the entire scope
41. For application in the field of insurance see 59 Stat. 34 (1945), upheld in Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); rent control, 62 Stat. 96 (1948), upheld in
Woods v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, 84 F. Supp. 660 (1948) [held the act un-
constitutional], reversed in Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948) ;, United States v. Bize,
86 F. Supp. 939 (1949).
42. 48 Stat. 782 (1934-).
43. 144 F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 3d 1944).
44. 60 Stat. 789 (1946), 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 1073.
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of the legislation is enlarged by making it an offense against the United
States to use the channels of interstate commerce to escape from custody
or from enforcement after conviction. Indeed, in its present form, it
may even be that the statute is capable of use as a supplement to the
ordinary processes of state law where a parolee or probationer evades
supervision whether under the Interstate Compact for the Supervision
of Parolees and Probationers or otherwise.
There appears to have been very little litigation under the statute
since it was amended in 1946. However, it has been held that a person
returned to the judicial district where the original crime would be prose-
cuted is not immune from the service of state process and prosecution
for the original crime.4 5 It would appear then that there is no judicial
barrier to the accomplishment of the clear purpose of the statute.
At the present time, the act is being used on an average of approxi-
mately fifty cases a year. Whether these cases actually involve close
cooperation with state law enforcement officers is difficult to say. The
Fugitive Felon Act is not well known to many police departments and
prosecutor's offices; and perhaps more important, the ever increasing
adoption by the states of the uniform extradition and witnesses acts
usually makes it possible for states to place primary reliance on inter-
state rather than on national-state cooperation. Nevertheless, the statute
remains a valuable supplement to the more frequently used procedures.
In fact, it might be more useful still if broadened to include proceedings
related to all felonies and perhaps the more serious misdemeanors.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
The Fourteenth Amendment can also present problems of coordina-
tion in the enforcement of criminal laws. By a now familiar process of
judicial construction, the Due Process Clause of this amendment has
come to embody most of the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. 4
Often a defendant who believes that state procedures do not live up to
these requirements of due process seeks collateral relief in the federal
courts while the state proceeding is still in progress or in order to
escape the effect of a state court ruling. This is most commonly at-
tempted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
The usual rule in such cases is that the federal courts will not take
jurisdiction unless the defendant has exhausted all his remedies at state
law or unless the remedy at state law is not plain, speedy, and efficient.
4 7
45. United States v. Conley, 80 F. Supp. 700 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
46. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
47. Ex Parte Haiwk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944-); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884).
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Although a judicious application of this rule serves to keep confusion
at a minimum, difficulties sometimes arise. In Dye V. Johnson,48 a con-
victed felon had escaped from a Georgia prison and fled to Pennsylvania.
When his whereabouts became known, Georgia requested extradition.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the prisoner's return to
Georgia, but Johnson petitioned a United States district court for a
writ of habeas corpus.
In the proceedings to obtain the writ, the petitioner argued that
return to Georgia would violate his constitutional rights because it
would expose him to serious danger of violence and would invite the
resumption of alleged cruel treatment practiced upon him before his
escape.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that extradition had
been improperly ordered by the Pennsylvania courts and asserted that
in cases of this sort, it was possible to examine into the actual situation
in order to see whether the fugitive would really be in danger if
returned.4
9
If this holding had stood, it would have presented a case wherein a
state would have been prevented from cooperating with a sister state.
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the holding. Un-
fortunately there was no opinion. It is therefore impossible to say with
any degree of assurance what the ground of the reversal was. However,
the most likely possibility appears to be that the Supreme Court was of
the opinion that if substantive questions touching upon Johnson's treat-
ment in Georgia were to be examined, they should be dealt with either
in the Georgia courts or by a federal district court in that state.50 The
state tribunals are also obligated to enforce the Federal Constitution
and the Federal District Court in Georgia would be in a better position
to get at the facts.
Even though Johnson v. Dye presents the problem in an oblique
fashion, there is a procedural point of some importance involved. On
a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has upset state decisions or
sanctioned the intervention of lower federal courts on the ground that
the procedural law of a state was so intricate or vague that it did not
assure a defendant due process of law.5' It may be that this is a field
in which similarity, if not uniformity accompanied by simplification of
48. 70 S. Ct. 146 (1949), reh. denied 345 U.S. 128- (1951).
49. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (C.C.A. 3d 1949).
50. All the Court did was to cite Ex Parte Hawk, supra note 47. It may be that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is properly applied here. For the view of the Attorney
General of Georgia see Cook, Interstate Extradition and State Sovereignty, 1 MERtCER L.
REv. 147 (1950).
51. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) and cases cited therein.
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criminal procedure is desirable. Although the problem is much larger
than its interstate aspects it is none the less important to effective co-
operation among the states, particularly where extradition is involved.
The danger is that so long as some state codes of criminal procedure
are inadequate, the courts of sister states will be forced to so declare
and to refuse extradition. A determination by the judicial arm of one
state government that another state is denying rights safeguarded by
the United States Constitution is not a pleasant prospect from the policy
point of view even though it is a judicial possibility.
